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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HARLEN W. BROWN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 20885

HARRY HEATHMAN, INC., HARRY
HEATHMAN doing business as
Heathman Investment Company and
Heathman Properties,
Defendants and Respondents,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant herewith submits to this Court the
following issues for disposition upon this appeal:
1. Whether the District Court Judge's findings were in
accordance with the evidence. The findings were:
A.

That Defendants did not knowingly make false

statements to Plaintiff regarding the character of the automobile
purchased and did not act fraudulently to induce Plaintiff to
purchase the automobile;
B.

That Defendants did not act with scienter;

1

C.

That Defendants did not commit actual acts of fraud

or any deceptive act or practice which would support recission of
the purchase and sale contract.
2.

Whether the District Court Judge failed to make findings

on whether the Defendants breached the purchase and sale contract.
3. Whether the District Court Judge committed error in
failing to award Plaintiff the value of the trade-in vehicle which
was retained by Defendantsf or some portion of the value;
4. Whether the District Court Judge committed error at
trialf over the objections of Plaintiff's counsel, in permitting
counsel for the Defendants to read into evidence portions of the
transcript of the deposition of Robert H. Posey.

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
Plaintiff instituted this action against Defendants on
October 22, 1979. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had made
material misrepresentations of fact to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff
had justifiably relied upon the misrepresentations in entering into
a contract with Defendants. Plaintiff further alleged that
Defendants failed to perform the terms of the contract. The
contract concerned Plaintiff's purchase of a 1979 Buick Regal
automobile from Defendants, and the trade-in by Plaintiff of a 1978
Chevrolet truck.

Defendants filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff.

2

UIS2QSUIQSL1S ,T,m ^QHER CQqRT?
The case was tried without a jury before Judge J. Robert
Bullock on May 13f 1985. On August 13f 1985, the Judge ruled that
Defendants1 counterclaim was dismissed for failure to prosecute and
that Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for no cause of action.'

Appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court
reversed and judgment entered in his favor on the issues of fraud,
breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.

STATfiMElfi: QP ,FACTS
On September 21f 1979f Plaintiff negotiated with Defendants
for the purchase of a new car. Defendants represented, in writing
and orally, that a 1979 Buick Regal automobile was new.

Plaintiff

executed Defendants' VEHICLE BUYER'S ORDER and a CONSUMER CREDIT
CONTRACT, both of which indicated in writing that the car was a new
vehicle.

Defendants' charged Plaintiff the new-car sticker price

for the automobile. As a down payment, Plaintiff traded in his 1978
Chevrolet truck which, at the time, was only a year old.
The day after Plaintiff had taken delivery of the car, he
discovered that the car was used and had in excess of 11,000 miles
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on it. Plaintiff endeavored to return the vehicle. Defendants1
indicated that they would "make it right" with him, although they
took no action to do so. Plaintiff refused to pay the balance owed
on the car and Defendants' repossessed it.
Upon Defendants' repossession of the Buick, they also
refused to return Plaintiff's trade-in vehicle, or to refund the
value thereof ($4,473.64) or any portion of the value.
Consequently, Plaintiff was without both the vehicle he had
purchased as a "new" vehicle and the vehicle he had traded in.

SUMMARY QF ABGUMEMI
The District Court committed error in the following
respects:
First, it ruled that Plaintiff failed to establish a cause
of action for fraud against the Defendants. To the contrary,
Plaintiff's evidence showed that Defendants knowingly or recklessly
made oral and written misrepresentations of fact for the purpose of
inducing Plaintiff to rely thereon. Plaintiff reasonably relied on
Defendant's misrepresentations and was damaged as a result.
The District Court's ruling is in part based on deposition
testimony which was erroneously admitted into evidence in the
absence of an adequate showing of witness unavailability, as
required by the Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah case law.
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Second, it failed to make any finding concerning Plaintiff's
cause of action for breach of contract, as required by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah case law.
Third, it failed to make any finding concerning the unjust
enrichment of Defendants concerning their repossession of the
vehicle purchased by Plaintiff.
Based upon these errors, the District Court's ruling in the
case should be reversed.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT HARRY HEATHMAN, INC. IS
NOT LIABLE FOR FRAUD IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE.
All of the elements of fraud were substantiated with
evidence offered by Mr. Brown at trial. Defendants did not appear
in person although their attorney attended the trial. They did not
call any witnesses. They offered only the deposition testimony of
one Robert Posey, Heathman's salesman, and the testimony was
admitted into evidence over the strong objection of Plaintiff's
counsel.

5

A.

REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD

In Utah a finding of fraud requires:
. . • a showing of a false representation of an existing
material fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the purpos
of inducing reliance thereon upon which plaintiff reasonab
relies to his detriment. Sugarhouse Finance Company v ^
Anderson. Utah, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1980).
Similarly, the elements of a cause of action for fraud are
outlined in Taylor v.. Gasor, Inc., Utah, 607 P.2d 292, 294 (1980)
as follows:
A finding of fraud must be based on the existence of all i
essential elements, i.e., the making of a false
representation concerning a presently existing material fa<
which the representator either knew to be false or made
recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the omission o
a material fact when there is a duty to disclose, for the
purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party,
with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to
that party.
See also Horton v.. Horton, Utah 695 P.2d 102 (1984) and Dugan v.
Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 1239 (1980).
B. HARRY HEATHMAN, INC. MADE FALSE REPRESENTATIONS TO
HARLEN BROWN CONCERNING A PRESENTLY EXISTING MATERIAL FACT
A cause of action for fraud involves a misrepresentation o
an existing material fact.

Sugarhouse Finance Company.v^_.Anderson

610 P.2d at 1373; Taylor v. Gasor, I n c . 607 P.2d at 294.
Harry Heathman, Inc. made oral and written representations
to Harlen Brown that the 1979 Buick Regal they offered to sell him
was "new."

The oral representations were made on September 12, 19

by Robert H. Posey, the authorized agent of the Defendant who was
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negotiating the sale on Defendant's behalf.

(Record at 7 ) .

Defendant made two separate written representations that the 1979
Buick Regal was a new vehicle.

The Vehicle Buyer's Order

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 at trial) and Consumer Credit Contract
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 at trial), prepared and completed by
Heathman's representativef both indicate that the 1979 Buick Regal
was new.

Both forms contained boxes which could be checked to

indicate that the car was either "NEW" or "USED."

On both forms,

Heathman's representative checked the boxes indicating that the 1979
Buick Regal was "NEW."
In determining whether or not a fact is material, the
Supreme Court of Kansas in Timi .v.. Prescott_State_Bankf 553 P.2d
315f 325f 220 Kan. 377 (1976) stated as follows:
A fact is material if it is one to which a reasonable person
would attach importance in determining his choice of action
in the transaction involved. (Citations omitted).
The fact that a car is new or used is indeed a fact to which
reasonable people would attach importance in considering a purchase.
It is often the first factor a buyer would consider.
The oral and written representations made by Harry Heathman,
Inc. to Harlen Brown concern the existence of a material fact; i.e.,
the new or used status of an automobile.

The representation is not

in the nature of a promise of future action, judgment, intention,
prediction or conjecture which would work to defeat a cause of
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action for fraud.

The statement made concerned one of the most

essential elements of the sales transaction.
Infirfifin-,Ixees-.Entfirpxi5fi5^^Infl->^g->-.PaliDL..SpringsAlpine
£s££±£S^In£., 427 P.2d 805f 808, 59 Cal.Rptr. 141 (1967), the Court
cited the well-settled rule that the misrepresentation of even a
single material fact upon which plaintiff had a right to, and did,
rely will support a judgment for fraud.

S&& £l££ Callahan .v^ Wolfe,

400 P.2d 938, 944 (Idaho, 1965).

C. THE DEFENDANT EITHER KNEW THAT SUCH REPRESENTATIONS WERE
FALSE OR MADE THEM IN RECKLESS DISREGARD AS TO THEIR TRUTH
OR FALSITY.
Scienter is a requisite element in a cause of action for
fraud.

Sugarhouse^Finance Company v .^Anderson, 610 P.2d at 1373;

Taylor..g^Gaaarf 607 P.2d at 294.
Harry Heathman Inc. knew that the 1979 Buick Regal which it
sold to Harlen Brown was a used vehicle.

The evidence showed that

Heathman had loaned/leased the car to the BYU athletic department
and that it had been driven by the BYU athletic director.

(Record

at 27). Therefore, Heathman's oral and written representations to
Harlen Brown stating that the vehicle was new were false and
Heathman Inc. knew the same.
In Ismn-^£Qlin±LY^S^X2l£L~2lmQU£h

,V» PQEtet, 464 P.2d 815 f

11 Ariz.App. 369 (1970)f the Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed
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the trial court judgment of an automobile buyer in his cause of
action for fraud against the dealer. The Plaintiff bought a car
with an odometer reading of 2f000 miles.

It was determined that the

mileage was actually 7f000 miles. The Court found that knowledge of
the falsity of the representation could properly be imputed to the
dealer, making proof of actual knowledge unnecessary.
In a similar case in Colorado/ Karan v. Bob Post, Inc., 521
P.2d 1276 (Colo.App. 1974) , it was undisputed that the salesman made
a false representation regarding the mileage of the automobile. The
court rejected his lack of knowledge as a defense to fraud. Citing
StimBon^v., Helps, 9 Colo. 33f 10 P. 290, the Court stated:
1

. . . He who makes a representation as to his own
knowledge, not knowing whether it be true or false, and it
is in fact untrue, is guilty of fraud as much as if he knew
it to be untrue. In such a case he acts to his own
knowledge falsely, and the law imputes a fraudulent intent.1
(Emphasis in original).
In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d at 1246 this Court held that
circumstances impose upon a real estate vendor a "special duty to
know the truth of his representations."

The Court continued, at p.

1246, as follows:
Where the nature of the situation is such [that] the vendor
is presumed to know the facts to which his representation
relates, a misrepresentation is fraudulent even though not
made knowingly, willfully or with actual intent to deceive.
An automobile dealer and its agents occupy a position
similar to that of vendors of real estate. Both have knowledge, or
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access to knowledge, which is not readily ascertainable or
accessible to the buyer of a car or land.

The circumstances impose

a special duty upon a dealership to know the truth of its
representations, and, in addition, the dealer is presumed to know
the facts to which its representations relate. The agent for Harry
Heathman, Inc. made material misrepresentations to Harlen Brown.
Those misrepresentations, if made knowingly or in reckless disregard
for their truth or falsity, were fraudulent.

Because of the special

duty of Harry Heathman, Inc. to know the truth of its
representations, and because of the legitimate presumption that
Harry Heathman, Inc. knew the facts on which its representations
were based, the misrepresentations by Harry Heathman, Inc. were
fraudulent.

D. THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY DEFENDANT WERE MADE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF INDUCING RELIANCE ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF, AND
PLAINTIFF DID IN FACT REASONABLY RELY ON THE
REPRESENTATIONS.
In order to prove fraud, the material misrepresentations
must have been made for the purpose of inducing reliance on the part
of the other party and must have induced actual and justifiable

reliance.

sugarhQuae ,Einans£-,CaiDpan¥ s.» AndeisQPf 610 P.2d at 1373;

Taylor v.^Gasor,

607 P . 2 d a t

294.
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The oral and written representations by Harry Heathman, Inc.
to Harlen Brown that the 1979 Buick Regal was a new vehicle may only
be construed as having been made for the purpose of inducing
reliance by Harlen Brown.

Harlen Brown entered the Defendant's

showroom intending to buy a new car.

(Record at 27). The

Defendant's agent knew of Harlen Brown's intent.

Harry Heathman,

Inc. represented orally and in writing that the car being considered
by Harlen Brown was a new one and thereby met Plaintiff's
requirements.

The representations could have been made to serve no

purpose other than inducing Mr. Brown to purchase the automobile.
In Town_& Country Chrysler Plymouth v.. Porter. 464 P.2d at
817, after refusing to set aside the Plaintiff's verdict for fraud
against the Defendant dealer, the Court stated:
. . . The Plaintiff certainly had a right to rely on the
mileage representation, (citation omitted), and where, as
here, the representor has a motive of monetary gain, the
jury would be justified in finding an intent that the
purchaser rely upon the representation, (citations omitted).
Furthermore, if the jury found that the mileage
representation was intended to cause the Plaintiff to act in
reliance thereon, it could infer the requisite intent to
deceive.
In the instant case, the element of reliance is unequivocal.
Mr. Brown purchased the 1979 Buick Regal based on Harry Heathman,
Inc.'s oral and written representations that the automobile was new.
Mr. Brown testified at the trial of this case that he would not have
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purchased the automobile had he known it was a used vehicle.
(Record at 24, 25).
Mr. Brown's reliance on Harry Heathman, Inc.'s
representations that the 1979 Buick Regal was a new car was
undoubtedly reasonable. A prospective purchaser entering an
automobile dealership is certainly entitled to rely on the dealer's
representations of the specifications of the automobile being
purchased.

The dealer is in a superior position to know the facts

regarding the automobile. The purchaser has no independent source
of knowledge regarding the automobile.

The buyer, therefore,

frequently has no alternative but to rely on the representations
made by the dealer.
In Gheever v>, Schramm, Utah, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (1978), this
Court held that:
Although it is correct that a party is not required to
independently ascertain the truth of every representation
made in a transaction such as this one, one claiming fraud
must show he acted reasonably under the circumstances . . .
In determining [reasonableness], factors such as the
respective age, intelligence, experience, mental condition,
and knowledge of each party should be considered, along wit!
their access to information, and the materiality of the
representations.
An automobile dealership unquestionably possesses more
experience in auto sales, greater knowledge relating to the specific
automobile involved, and superior access to information than does a
consumer buyer. Mr. Brown is a truck driver (Record at 23) and
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testified that he was tired when he entered the dealership as he had
just returned from a delivery "run,"

(Record at 7 ) .

The relative

position of the parties in the instant case and consideration of the
circumstances requires a finding that Harlen Brown reasonably relied
on the material misrepresentations of fact made by Harry Heathman,
Inc.
This Courtf in Dugan.v.. Jones, 615 P.2d at 1247 held:
. . . a vendee of real property, in the absence of facts
putting him on noticef has no duty to investigate to
determine whether the vendor has misrepresented the area
conveyed. Neither is a vendee estopped from recovering for
misrepresentation of the area of the land conveyed merely
because he viewed or inspected the premisesf so long as he
did not endeavor to determine independently the exact
quantity of land. Nor is a vendee estopped from recovering
in an action for deceit because he had the opportunity to
inspect or otherwise check the property prior to purchase.
In the instant casef thereforef Harlen Brown is not
precluded from recovery by any contention that he was deficient in
failing to make an independent determination of the mileage
registered on the automobile.

To the contrary, Mr. Brown acted

reasonably in relying on the Defendant's representations that the
car was "new."

E. HARLEN BROWN SUSTAINED DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANT'S
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
It is essential that Plaintiff have sustained damages in a
cause of action for fraud.

Dilworth v A .Lauritzen. Utahf 424 P.2d
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136f 138 (1967); Child v. Hayward, Utah 400 P.2d 758, 759 (1965).
Harlen Brown entered into a written agreement to purchase
the "new" 1979 Buick Regal for $ 9f123.64. Mr. Brown traded in his
1978 Chevrolet truck as a down payment in the amount of $ 4,473.64.
(Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 & 2 at trial).

When he discovered that

the Buick was not new, Mr. Brown attempted to rescind the contract
buy returning the car to Harry Heathman, Inc. and obtaining the
return of his truck.

(Record at 19f 22 & 23). Harry Heathman, Inc,

would not cooperate. Mr. Brown did not make payments on the Buick
and Harry Heathman, Inc. repossessed it.

(Record at 20,21).

Mr.

Brown traded in his truck, which he owned free and clear, on a used
car which he was told was "new" and which was repossessed, and was
left by Harry Heathman, Inc. without either vehicle. The
substantial damage to Mr. Brown is obvious.
Utah law requires that trial court findings be "supported b^
substantial evidence."

Hidden Meadows^Development Company.v^Milis

Utah, 590 P.2d 1244, 1250 (1979).
The trial court's findings in the instant case that
Defendant had not committed fraud against the Plaintiff is not
supported by "substantial" evidence. Rather, the ruling is against
the clear weight of the evidence supporting fraud.
the trial court, therefore, must be reversed.
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The judgment of

?. THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHALLENGED
BY THE DEFENDANT. THE ONLY ATTEMPT BY DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL
TO CHALLENGE PLAINITFF'S EVIDENCE WAS THROUGH THE OFFER OF
THE DEPOSITION OF ONE ROBERT H. POSEY AS EVIDENCE. THE
TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF PORTIONS OF THE
DEPOSITION WAS ERROR IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE SHOWING
OF LEGAL UNAVAILABILITY OF POSEY AS A WITNESS.
Rule 804(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the
conditions upon which out-of-court deposition testimony (hearsay) is
admissible as substantive evidence at trial.

The rule states:

"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which
the declarant
(1) is exempted by . . . privilege; or
(2)

persists in refusing to testify . . .; or

(3)

testifies to a lack of memory . . .; or

(4)

is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental
illness or infirmity; or

(5)

is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his
statement has been unable to procure his attendance
by process or other reasonable means.

In Madrid v. .Scholea, 546 P.2d 863 (N.M.App. 1976), the
defendant's attorney sought to introduce previous testimony of two
witnesses who were not present at the trial.

On their absencef the

defendant's attorney commentedf "Subpoenas were sentf I don't have a
return by these - - -."
testimony.

The trial court admitted the former

Concerning part (5) of the Rulef the Court of Appeals of

New Mexico reversed the trial court's admission of former testimony

15

into evidence and recited the requirement of Rule 804(a)(5) that th<
party show "that he was unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by process or other reasonable means/' (p. 865). The Court
of Appeals held that the defendant did not comply with the Rule.
In the present case, counsel for Heathman, Inc. offered as
evidence portions of the deposition of Robert H. Posey.
34).

(Record at

Said counsel did not call any witnesses or attempt to put on

any other evidence. Upon the objection of Brown's counsel, the
court inquired into the availability of Mr. Posey.

Heathman's

counsel replied,
"He is [unavailable], your Honor. We have been unable to
locate him. Mr. Heathman does not know where he's at. Mr.
Heathman doesn't have any employee around anymore except fo
Walt Farmer. Mr. Parmer does not know where Mr. Posey is,
either. . . no service of a subpoena has been attempted
because we didn't even have an address for him to even try
that." (Record at 34, 35).
Plaintiff's counsel objected on the ground that the proffer
by Defendant's counsel did not satisfy the requisite showing that
attendance of the witness had been attempted "by process or other
reasonable means". Judge Bullock noted that Heathman's attorney he
orally represented that the witness was unavailable, and asked
Brown's attorney if more than that was required.

(Record at 35).

Plaintiff's attorney responded in the affirmative and reserved his
right to further objection.

(Record at 35). Later, Plaintiff's

attorney renewed his objection to the admission of the Posey
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deposition on the ground that there had been inadequate proof of
legal unavailability of the witness.

(Record at 48). Judge Bullock

overruled the objection and ruled that Defendant's attorney had met
the required showing of unavailability under Rule 804.

(Record at

48 & 51). He stated that Rule 804 did not require the
issuance of a summons [sic], when the proponent of the
defendant [sic] doesn't know where the summons [sic] can be
served or has made some reasonable effort, which he says he
hasf to ascertain the whereabouts of the deposer [sic].
(Record at 51).
The Judge ruled that the deposition testimony was admissible
under Rule 804(b).

(Record at 51). Rule 804(b) presupposes a

determination of declarant unavailability as defined in Rule 804(a).
The Judge's reliance upon 804(b) wasf thereforef inappropriate.
In Madrid, the Defendant's attorney attempted service of
subpoenas on the absent witnesses which the Court held to be an
inadequate attempt to secure their attendance.

In the instant case,

Defendant's attorney did not even attempt service of a subpoena to
procure the attendance of Mr. Posey.
The only evidence of declarant unavailability in this case
was the oral conclusion by Defendant's attorney that the witness was
"unavailable."

(Record at 34 & 35). Under the clear language of

Rule 804(a), and the guidance of Madrid, that is a wholly
insufficient showing of declarant unavailability.

Therefore, the

District Court's admission into evidence of the deposition of Robert
H. Posey was error.
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THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE A FINDING ON THE
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT IS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, . . .
This Court unequivocally restated this principle in, and
remanded for more definite findings, the case of Silliman v*
Powell, Utah, 642 P.2d 388, 391 (1982) as follows:
As the determiner of fact, the trial court is required to
make findings on all material issues.
The Court likewise remanded for more definite findings the case of
Rucker v. Dalton, Utah, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1979) and explained
its reasons for the requirement as follows:
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings
of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to the
resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. To that
end, findings should be sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
In £QiliJ^II^^_ZiflD^£ixai^^atiQnftl .Bank, Utah, 611 P.2d 392, 394-95
(1980), this Court quoted Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., and continued:
This requirement is mandatory and may not be waived. . . .
Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material
issues is reversible error.
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S&& also Bayer v. Lignell,. Utah, 567 P.2d 1112f 1113 (1977).
The Plaintiff pled (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 13f & 14) and argued (Record at 71, 72, 73 & 78)
a cause of action for breach of contract. The Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered by the Honorable J. Robert Bullock state
only that Plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for fraud,
and indeed fail to even mention a contract cause of action. The
absence of a finding on Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of
contract and the strong statements of this Court requiring findings
on all issues mandate the reversal of the lower court decision on
this issue.

gfllMT III
DEFENDANT'S REPOSSESSION OF THE 1979 BUICK REGAL AND
RETENTION OF THE 1978 CHEVROLET TRUCK CONSTITUTE UNJUST
ENRICHMENT.
An established maxim of equity jurisprudence is that of
unjust enrichment.

On this topic 30 C.J.S. Equity Sec. 89 states

in part:
One must not enrich himself at the expense of another; and
equity seeks to prevent unjust enrichment, and will not
permit one to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of
another.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tgxag_.CQ^y^MJLIler,
165 F.2d 111, 114-15 (5th Cir. 1947), states as follows:
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. • . Equity does not look with favor on the unjust
enrichment of one person at the expense of another and will
generally exercise its offices either by applying the
principle of subrogation or by declaring the existence of a
constructive trust or of an equitable lien in prevention
thereof.
In E*L*.,Bl»CS.S&*^jt-3La&l&2~hUlDb2JL^Q^~Q£^tetenatt,

79

F.Supp. 176, 189 (D.C.W.D. Ark. 1948), the Court repeated the
familiar principle as follows:
. . . equity will not permit one to unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another. . . .
After Harlen Brown rescinded his contract to purchase the
1979 Buick Regal, Harry Heathman, Inc. repossessed the Regal.
(Record at 20, 21). Heathman, Inc. refused Brown's requests to
return his trade-in vehicle, the 1978 Chevrolet truck.

(Record at

19, 22, & 23). As a result, Heathman, Inc. possessed the 1979 Buick
Regal or proceeds from its subsequent re-sale, and the 1978
Chevrolet truck or proceeds from its subsequent re-sale. Such
retention of both vehicles constitutes unjust enrichment by
Heathman, Inc.

CQNCmSIQfl
The District Court erred in its ruling that Plaintiff had
not established a cause of action for fraud and erred in failing to
make a ruling on Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract
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and unjust enrichment.

The judgment of the lower court must,

therefore, be reversed.

DATED this 6th day of November, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN

M^V<wVX
-1~W U^>
Randall J. rtoMgren
Attorney fon Appellant
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GARY L. CHRYSTL. •
Attorney for Defendants
42 North University Ave.
Suite 4, P.O. Box 1045
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: 375-3121

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo™
HARLEN W. BROWN,
Plaintiff,

:

-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
Civil No. 52,832

HARRY HEATHMAN, INC.; HARRY
HEATHMAN d/b/a HEATHMAN INVESTMENT
COMPANY; and HEATHMAN PROPERTIES,

:
:

Defendants.
—-oooOooo—This matter came on regularly for trial on the 13th day of May, 1985.
Plaintiff was represented by Randall J. Holmgrem and Defendants were
represented by Gary L. Chrystler.

As a preliminary matter, Defendant, Harry

Heathman Inc., indicated, by and through counsel, that it would not prosecute
its Counterclaim and the same was dismissed.

Plaintiff was sworn and testified

concerning the allegations in his Complaint and in support of his cause of
action against the Defendants.

At the request of Plaintiff's counsel, portions

of the Deposition of Robert H. Posey, salesman for Harry Heathman Inc., were
published and admitted into evidence.

At the conclusion of evidence the

matter was taken under advisement by the Court.

Having reviewed the testimony

and evidence submitted and heard the arguments and being fully advised in
the premises, the Court now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendants1 Counterclaim is dismissed for failure to prosecute.
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2.

Plaintiff, Harlen W. Brown, is a resident of Glenrock, Wyoming.

3.

Harry Heathman Inc., is a Utah Corporation licensed to do business

in the state of Utah.
4.

Harry Heathman is a resident of the state of Utah.

5.

On or about September 12, 1979, Harlen W. Brown was the owner of a

1978 Chevrolet automobile.
6.

On or about September 12, 1979, Harry Heathman Inc., sold Plaintiff

a 1979 Buick Regal automobile for the total sum of $12,175.72.
7.

Plaintiff traded in his 1978 Chevrolet automobile and received a

credit as a down payment therefor in the sum of $4,473.64.
8.

The balance of the contract purchase price of $5,915*44 was financed

over a period of 48 months at an annual interest rate of 13.30 percent.
9.

Pursuant to the parties1 agreement, on September 12, 1979, Plaintiff

executed a Vehicle Buyer's Order which indicated that the vehicle purchased
by him was a new 1979 Buick Regal and that it had an outgoing odometer readin
of 11,946 miles.
10.

Also on September 12, 1979, to facilitate financing, Plaintiff

executed a Conditional Sales Contract and Security Agreement which indicated
the vehicle he was purchasing from Harry Heathman Inc., was a new 1979 Buick
Regal automobile.
11.

After purchase of the 1979 Buick Regal , Plaintiff brought suit

against Defendants for recision of the purchase contract claiming Defendants
had fraudulently induced the purchase by knowingly and falsely misrepresents
the fact that the 1979 Buick Regal had been a driver's training car.
12.

Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof regarding allegations

of fraud in that Plaintiff failed to convince the Court that Defendant, Harr
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Heathman Inc., or any of its employees or authorized agents knowingly made
false statements to Plaintiff regarding the character of the automobile
purchased nor did Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or any of its authorized
agents or employees by their acts fraudulently induce Plaintiff into purchasing
the 1979 Buick Regal.
13.

Plaintiff also failed to meet his burden of proof regarding establish-

ing by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or
any of its authorized agents or employees acted with scienter in this matter.
14.

Plaintiff, Harlen W. Brown, has therefore, failed to establish his

cause of action by failing to convince the Court by clear and convincing eviden
that the Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or any of its authorized agents or
employees committed actual acts of fraud in this transaction nor did Harry
Heathman Inc. or any of its authorized employees or agents commit any deceptive
act or practice which would support recision of the parties purchase and sale
contract.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Counterclaim of the Defendants is hereby dismissed for failure

to prosecute.
2.

Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed for no cause of action

against all Defendants.
3.

No costs are awarded either party.

DATED this

day of

, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

J. ftOdERT 6 U L L 0 C K —
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

|(

HARRY HEAThMAN, INC.
175 North 100 West

Telephone 373-9500

PROVO U T A H 84601
CHEVROLET

BUICK

OPEL

!

CRi
-

1

2

LUV

r

c SALE—D'SCLOSURE STATEMENT

"h

Prl<

*

Downimyment Consisting of
A

Cash Downpayment

O

rotal Down payment (2 A & B)

VEHICLE BUYER'S ORDER
DATE OF ORDER W -

BUYER J

^ - T H

\^r,\^^\

ADDRESS j r m

js^.

Ok

\iV

i.

*-*-"" ' .

\ ?D C

3

Unpaid BaUnce of f i s h Price (1 - 2 C )

4

Othfr C h a r t s Cunss intr of
•A l)\tu
1 Pi y cal
DamuKe rn« i anee
%

I

CITY
COUNTY
v-^C^
STATE AND
i"- , > PwO\ff
J_ / . ^ j r A
ZIP CODE
^A
t r V O ^
I hereby order from you, subject to all terms conditions and agreements contained
herein, and the ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS printed on the reverse sid» hereof
the following
6 NEW
D USED VEHICLE
YEAR
^ MAKE r>,«,... j Q , ^ MODEL
JfiaC U
TYPE
COLOR t < ^ i U >L^->L SERIAL N Q i ^ j w ^
< --v
STOCK NO <
TO BE DELIVERED ON OR ABOL"^
l$Ol
Cash Selling Price

D sahihty Ins J
D Sales THN
$
F Licpnw Transfer QJ TXlSCS
Total Other Chnrjres
4A B C I> >
Lnpa 1 BAI incc (Amount
Financed) 1 -r At)

6. FINANCE CHARGE

X1IQ.

1XL

Defeired Payment Price (1 -4- 4F 3

1

.

1 '
|*
|$ 0*3 «.,;
i . ^5£J ^ i
,$

'^OOAT-

Total fpT optional equipment ard /r - services
^>ub Total
Less ahowance for mv * ^^ff"
^ s(Model)
1

^

^ (^ii\e*r ^ » i i e i \ £ .

f ^r

ry>j

;o~C>,c-..>^

t

(Serial No )
(Deduc Prom

iBody Styled

%

Finance charges to begin acciue on

11 TOT \ L OF PAYMENTS shall be repaid
to SELLER m
consecutive installments
of S
each on the
day of each
rronth beginning
, 19
, PLUS $
on
, 19
X
, and $ .
on
,19
X
If any installment is more than twice the
amount of an j^herwise regular \ scheduled
equal w* ment it is a BALLOON PAYMENT
u tich tray be refinanced without pena ty.
Ix^ntify each "BALLOON PAYMENT" at
" X " above.

Total Installed Pricei $

. .r-tC... *VL.
. ^ -*C« ^ u - , ^ r ^

Total of Payment! (

^ A N N U A L PERCENTAGE PATE
10

Optional Equipment or Services

j

With equipment as appraised s ubT i n
AMOL \ , r n SUBJECT TO <ALES TAX
Sales Tax ,
License and Transfer of Title
Total Cash Selling Price
TRADE IN ALLOWANCE
Less Balance Owing to

12 If any installment is in defau't more than 10 days,
default cnarges shall be oavab o n the amount of 57c
of the H mqut nt nstallment or $5, whicn^ver is less,
or at s«. c r s eifct on an amount
equal *o >~e annual
percentage
rate statnd above t rie>. +*\e u lD^id amount
of the installment from tne c I date of the installment until paid n full, counting each day as l/30th
of a month
14 If this contract is prepaid, a refund credit comnutec n acor^ ncc with the rule o> 73s v»i I be made
to Buytr, sun c f o retention
ov seller of a minimum
financt charge jf $5 il f ne mount financed does not
exceed ^75, or S7 50 l «niount financed exceeds
$75 No rebate will oe made if the amount thereot
is 'ess than SI
4A PHYSICAL DAMAGE INSURANCE against
accidental damage to the Property ror a term oi
months i^ checked G Comprenensive Coverage
G Fire Thet* and Additional Coverage
G $
Deductible Coll sion
• Towing and Labor insurance settlement will be
based upon actual casn vame of Property at time oi
loss not exceeding ' nuts of lability set forth in
pol cy, and payaoit to Buyer, Seller or Assignee of
Seller, as interests may appear
BL YER MAY CHOOSE T H E PFRSON THROUGH
WHICH THE INSURANCE IS ~
^ OBT \ I N E D

Net Allowance (Which allowance I guarantee
free from all encumbrances )
Deposit Herewith
Cash Due on Delivery
**4B & C CREDI^ LIFE AND/OR " ^ A B I L I T Y
INSURANCE according to *erms and conditions set
Total Down Payment
forth m policy or certificate if insurance issued by
Unpaid Cash Price Balance
NAME
INSURER
Total T nsuranee Premium Q Q r A V A r Q i HOME OFFICE
Property Tax on Trade-m
ADDRESS
Additional Informat on P"^.*"?" C O D t \QU(**
* ^ ) Z > 6 d Q . S ' l IF CHARGE FOR CREDIT LIFF AND/OR DISACUSTOMER TO < ORNISH OWN COLLISION AND LIABILITY
| BILITY INSURANCE, IS TO V_
.NCLUDED ' N
ORDER, INSERT CHARGE i\ T LINE 4B & C
INSURANCE AND ACCEPTS FULL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
i AMD ^ A V F BUYER AND CO BUYER SIGN
THIS STATEMENT BEFORE SIGNING ORDER
FOR DAMAGE DUE TO COLLISION
BELOW
NOTICE TO CUSTOMER" I HAVE BEEN MA HE NO PROMISES
BUYER IS NOT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN CREDIT
BY HARRY HEATHMA.N INC REPRESENTATIVES NOT LISTED
LIFE AND/OR DISAS'LIT' INSURANCE COVERAGE.
IN THIS CONTRACT OTHER THAN REPAIR ORDER
AS TO
The undersigned hereby affirm (s) that the charge
ACCESSORIES, FREE WORK, OR ANY ITEM NOT LISTED ON
for credit life and/or disability insurance shown in
item 4B & C of *his Disclosure Statement h * been
THIS CONTRACT WARRANTIES TYPE
NO
I
disclosed
m writing (o the u <^t r igned prior o exeHAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS CONTRACT FULLY
cution H\ 'he under*> fpned of this statement and that
BUYERS SIGNATURE X
after suth disclosure ne undersigned specifica j affirm(s) that the unuf-rs gned u w r e K to ootam * e
MANAGER DISCLOSING THIS CONTRACT X
insurance for whicn a^ amount is included aoove
Salesman \ 7^%^ &zY
DATE
BUYER'S
APPROVED BY
SIGNATURE X
THIS ORDER IS NOT VALID UNLESS SIGNED
CO-BUYER'S
DATE
AS ACCEPTED H E ^ E BY SALESMANAGER
SIGNATURE X
OR OFFICER OF ^ H E COMPANY
NOTICE TO T H E BL^cER Do not sign this order before you read it or if it contains any •>' ink spaces in the CREDIT SALE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT portion hereof if credit is extended You are entitled to an exact couv of *he order you si(?->
3UYER ACKNOWLEDGES he has read and -ece ved a complete copy of this order comprising «he entire igreementjiffet'
this purchase
\ Buyer Signs
7
B Co Buyer Signs

x

" -y

/ v j , /'«^<f>-~^

x

CONDITIONS
I T i s FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED:
The order on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms and conditions which have been mutually agreed upon/
1.

The manufacturer has reserved the right to change the list price of new motor vehicles without notice and In the event ihat the list price of the
new vehicle ordered hereunder is so changed, the cash delivered price, which Is based on list price effective on the day of delivery, will govern
r this transaction. But if such cash delivered price is increased tne buyer may, if dissatisfied w»th such irceased price, cancel this order, in
which evant if a used vehicle has been traded in as a part of the consideration herein, such used vehicle sha i be r«i-j; ;ed to the buyer upon the,
payment of a reasonable charge for storage and repairs (if any) or, if the used vehicle nas csen previously soid by vr\$ dealer, the amount
received therefor, less a selling commission of 15% and any expense Incurred in storing, insuring, conditioning or advertising said vehicle for
sale,.shall be returned to the buyer.

2.

The buyer agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery o* such vehicle in the
•f same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear excepted, and the buyer warrants such used
vehicle to be his property free and clear of all lien and encumbrances except as otherwise noted herein.
....

3.

Upon the failure or refusal of the buyer to complete said purchase for any reason other than cancellation on account of increase in price, the
cash deposit may be retained as liquidated damages, or in the event a used vehicle nar> &*»r, taken in trade, the buyer hereby authorizes dealer
to sell said used vehicle, and the dealer shall be entitled to reimburse himself out of me proceeds of such sale, for the expenses specified in
paragraph 1 above and also for his expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of buyer's failure to ccmpiete said purchase.

4v

The manufacturer has the right to make any changes in the model or design of any accessories and part of any new motor vehicle at any time
without creating any obligation on the part of either the Dealer or the Manufacturer, to rnuice corresponding changes in the venicle coverec by
this order either before or subsequent to tne delivery of such vehicle to the buyer.

5.

Dealer shall not be liable for delays caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond the control of the dealer.

6. ' NO WARRANTIES ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER THE DEALER OR THE MANUFACTURER OF
THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHAS$:$ FURNISHED HEREUNDER, EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED
WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HERF.iN AND MADE A
PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHiCH WILL BE DELIVERED TO BUYER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW V10T0R VEHICLE
OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY QTHEP WARRANTY EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL 8E T H £ ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON
WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS.
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,-ARE M A D E S Y THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR MOTOR
VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT A 5 \--AY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING 3Y THE DEALER FOR SUCH USED
MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND
MADE A PART HEREOF. '
"7.
Jn case jhe vehicle covered by this order is a used vehicle, no warranty or representation is made as to the extent such vehicle has been used,
. / ' • ' * regaraiess of.the mileage shown on the speedometer of said used venicje.
&.

In the event that the transaction referred to in this order is not a cash transaction, the buyer herein, before or at the time of delivery of the
vehicle ordered, and in accordance with the terms and conditions of payments indicated cs the front of this order, will executs a conditional
sales contract, or such other form of security agreement as may be required to complete tnis transaction upon a time credit price :,asis.

9. - In the event that it becomes necessary for Dealer to enforce any of tha terms and conditions of this order, buyer agrees to pay reasonable
>r
attorney's fees and court costs.
1 0 . . . T h i s order is Non-Transferable.

•«

~?

*j}

y

*"*"

/

/

&

G

11: ' This order is subject to .credit approval by a financing institution, and in the event it is unacceptable to the financing institution, buyer will
•j-i T i <return vehicle covered by this order immediately to Deasar rf delivery has been made.
1 2 1 ; X L I A B I L I T Y INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY A N D DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED ;N THIS
. AGREEMENT.
i ^ A A . , • - ; : . - , v ' ; - .... '
\ A ' *A'': • _ . ,_,./,..
• "
••«" A . , , - . -A ' '"
13.

BUYER REPRESENTS he Is 18 years of age or older, and no credit has been extended except as appears on the reverse side.

14. *

This order constitutes the entire terms and agreements between the. parties hereto in reference to the vehicle ordered hereunder.

;

G.n«r,lMowstaptaK,cental*

*0 »

Z 5 3 7 3 , f A L l TAKE CITY. t'TAH 8fc*_*
Address
is a*3 edttor tr* this credit sale transaction solely for the disclosure purposes of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
Buyer (and Co Bjyer)—Name and Address (Include—County ard Z*p Code)

Seller—Name and Address

PARRY RSATUMAN^INC.
175 SORTH 100 WEST
PROVO, UTAH 84601

BA3XEN W BROWN
124 H 130 B
0RSM,,U7 84057

The seller hereby sells, and the buyer (meaning all undersigned buyers, jointly and severally) hereby purchases, subject to the terms set forth below and upon the n m •> side hereof,
he following property, delivery and acceptance of which in good order are hereby acknowledged by buyer, viz.-

+

Make Trade Name

[ New or Used (Year Model [ No.Cyl.

SET?

1979

8

Body Type — If Truck, Give GVW

tm o

BUTCK

Model No. or Series

J

l

Venic'e identification No.

1
1 4M47V92126640

HSGAL

If truck—Describe bodies 3rd major items of equipment sold—

Buyer represents" that the purchase of said property is primarily for personal, fam ly or household fjJv agricultural D , business (other than agricultural* ""' use (check one).
1. CASH PRICE (including any accessories, services and taxes imposed on the cash sale) . 9 * 3 7 . 3 A 6 4 . • SALES..TAX
23?.
V , 606 »39
2. TOTAL DOWAYMENT-Trade-in1223. CHSV
%4.473.64-$
MOWK j , 4 , 4 7 3 . 6 4 p i„ s %
_ BPKS $
4,473.64
Make, Model, Year

Gross Trade-in

(Payoff - made by

Allowance

seller)

'

Trade-in (Net)

t\)
m

Cash Downpayment

3. UNPAID BALANCE OF CASH PRICE (Pifference between Items 1 and 2)
4. OTHER CHARGES
*A. Cost of Required Physical Damage Insurance
* * 8 . Cost of Optional Mechanical Breakdown Insurance
BUYER MAY CHOOSE THE PERSON THROUGH WHICH THE INSURANCE IN A AND B IS TO BE OBTAINED.
C Cost of Creditor Insurance for the *er <• iereof.
COVERAGE OF THE BUYER BY ANY SUCH iNStP^CE IS NOT REQUIRED BY SELLER.
CHECK CRESiTOi
*** 2 X L u e
St*3GL£
.....v
INIVIAXCE OI$I*EO
{^Disability (Acadent ami Health)
Q Other (describe)

$_JJL122--J!L(3)
WHS
SOKE

f4A)
(48)

3 0 0 , 3 5 (Ata

*-

$,

J2LLH-(4O

_J^S-(4C)

BUYER'S APPROVAL: I DESIRE TO OBTAIN THE CREDITOR INSURANCE CHECKED ABOVE FOR THE BUYER PROPOSED FOR INSURANCE.

swr—

J9/12/7.3.
(Oate)

5.
6.
7.
3.
9.
1%

M^Jlx.

(Buyer's Signature}

\<.rr

(Co-Buyer's Signature)

Ua?5,(4D)
D OfKra! Fees (Describe)... SAFETY.. IHS..
5*25..BGC..EEB
7..30.
1
?.«Q (4E)
E. License and/or Registration Fees (Itemize)
5.
F. Certificate of Title Fee
S.
_~*IHL{4F>
?*0.flft fir.)
G. Other (Descnbe)
MUC.SER¥IGS.CQSr»ACT..3l6/5a,0(H).
1
UNPAID BALANCE-AMOUNT FINANCED (Sum of .terns 3 and 4)
%
5*2il*j£iL(5)
FINANCE CHARGE
$ l^lteJ&j®
TOTAL OF PAYMENTS (Sum of 'ems 5 and 6)
*.
$. 7.».702. 03,(7)
DEFERRED^PAYMENT PRICE (Sum of items 1,4 and 6)
$_Jj2jJLZlt_77_(3)
AHNUAl PERCENTAGE RATE
1 3 . 3 0 % <$
PAYMENT SCHEDULE: The Total o* Payments (Item 7) >s payab'e tf se'ler's ofice design ted be'ow or a* sud office of any assise* s ^ay be her '*&• des gnated m 4 * *
insta'ments of $
l£k£L££each f commenang - - J J 1 L 2 2 2 2 2
, 1?
, anc - r '^ same day of each success^ i.ci*i ^ereaner y s mdicated
m space below.

Any instalment which is more than t*ice the amount of an otherwise 'egu ar'y scheduled
equal instalment s > 3ALL00N PAYMENT Unl oS the property de«cnaed »n this contact is
to oe used primarily for agricultural or leasing purposes, bayer has *he «• ?ht *o rv • <>nce the amount of any da loon °ayment at the tirrs it <$ due -v.tnoui pe r . *y and under te^3
, * whici shall be no less favorable to the buyer than trs terms of the origins sale. T 'ese provisions do not app'y to the extent that the Paymen* Schedule is adjusted to f e *eason3.
~~ or irregulaf income of the buyer,
U . . DEFAULT CHARGE IN EVENT OF UATE PAYMENT If any msta'ment is not paid wMm 10 days after it is due, buyer agrees to pay a delmauency charge equal to 5% of the unpa.d .nstalment
not to eiczzd $3 if property hereunder is purchased onmar 'y 'or personal, far ly, lousehoid or agnciutura' use.
12 DESCRIPTION OF SECURITY INTEREST Seller retains a security interest under the oform Commercia' Code T the O'ooerty described above anc any proceeds to secure payment and
performance of buyer $.obkgatiou hereunder, including any adoitional indeotedness incurred as providea *erem and uncer any eittensions or renewals hereof
13. PREPAYMENT REBATE Upon prepayment in full buyer is entitled to a rebate of the Finance Charge (Item 6) comouted ir accordancew,tn t>,e py e of ™ * the obligation hereunder is
onginaily payable in 61 instalments or less, otherwise m accordance w.th the ac*uana' method A rmmmun - r ge wilt Ji retained n
<•" *s» arour i >he rebate as J
tows- $5 if the Amount Financed does not exceed $75 $7.50 when tl-« Amount cmanced exceeds $75 *** *»:?^e under $ 1 wil' -e paid.
**Opt»nal Wechanicai Breakdown Insurance
*Requsre«i ^jysscal Damage Insurance
Insurance Company.
Term:
months Insurance Company _ _ J H C
Q t .,
Deductible Collision—and also select one of the following*
T
erm Q 36 months or 35-000 miles whichever ocurs first
Q full Comprehensive mcludmg-FireT eft and Combined Add^ca! Coverage
Q $
Deductib CuTiprehensive mcludmg-Fire-Theft and Comoined Additional Coverage
Term [ 1 M I C 3 4 / 5 0 0 0 0
r ] Fire-Theft and Combined Additional Coverage
[2 $25 Deductible £ 550 Deductible £ ] $
Deductible
Optional if desired-Towing and Labor costs •
Renta1 Reimbursement [2
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RULE 52
FINDINGS BY THE COURT
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58A; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the c,ourt. Findings
of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under
Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).

RULE 804
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations
in which the declarant
.
• ••*:„„
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do HO; or
(!)) tout Hies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(6) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable
to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest,
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination.
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was
imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(:i) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of Its making
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended
to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him
against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history,
even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the
matter stated; or (8) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also,
of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or
marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to
have accurate information concerning the matter declared.
(6) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
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